Mind and consciousness

John Searle's 1980 thought experiment claims that running a program, however convincing its output, cannot give a computer real understanding of language.

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It is the question of why physical processes in the brain come with subjective experience, a puzzle that explaining brain functions does not appear to settle.

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Language models are trained to predict words. Researchers disagree on whether this yields understanding, and the answer depends on how meaning and understanding are defined.

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Frank Jackson's 1982 thought experiment imagines a color-vision scientist raised in black and white. It asks whether she learns something new on seeing color, a question aimed at physicalism.

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A philosophical zombie is an imagined being physically identical to a human but with no conscious experience. Philosophers use it to test whether physical facts can explain consciousness.

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Nagel argued that conscious experience is essentially subjective, so physical descriptions of the brain leave out what it is like to be a creature. He did not claim physicalism is false.

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Panpsychism is the view that mind or consciousness is fundamental and widespread in nature. Most versions say the tiniest parts of things have it, not that rocks think.

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The mind-body problem asks how mental life relates to physical states. Positions divide mainly into dualism and physicalism, with idealism and several sub-views, and each faces its own difficulty.

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